companies were also consulted. The main aim of comparing the three companies, rather than studying one firm, is to address the question 'why do firms in the same industry differ in their performance?' by focusing on differences in organisational processes and incentives (Nelson 1991) . At the same time, survey evidence is used to gauge the differences in the breadth and depth of supplier development activity in Japan, Europe and North America.
Section 1 discusses the organizational capabilities approach in so far as it is relevant to the topic of supplier development. Section 2 surveys the range of supplier development activities at each of the three automakers. Section 3 compares and contrasts the three companies' structures and processes for supplier development, and discusses the issue of replication of such structures and processes outside of Japan. The paper concludes by drawing broader theoretical implications concerning capabilities, governance and the boundary of the firm.
Supplier Development as an Organisational Capability and a Mechanism for

Replicating It
Supplier development is a procedure by a company to help improve its existing suppliers' capabilities. More specifically, it may be interpreted as a firm's attempt to replicate some aspects of the in-house organizational capability at its suppliers. The ability to replicate such capability is, in itself, also a capability. In the automobile industry, automakers may send their own engineers to the supplier's shopfloor to help solve a problem with a specific component in order to meet the product launch date. They may provide training courses for suppliers' employees in techniques such as TWI, Quality Circles, Value Engineering, and simultaneous engineering. They may also ask a supplier to work on a specific production line for an extended period with a view to learning heuristics to achieve cost reduction, inventory reduction or quality improvement.
The organizational capabilities that are being replicated at suppliers consist of a hierarchy of practiced routines that are coherent (Nelson 1991, p.68) . 'Routines' refer broadly to the way things are done in an organisation, and may include not only well-specified technical routines, but also 'the relatively constant dispositions and strategic heuristics that shape the approach of a firm to the non-routine problems it faces' (Nelson and Winter 1982, p.15) . In so far as such routines involve an important element of interaction and coordination between individuals, organizational capabilities are not fully reducible to individual skills.
Knowledge is typically distributed in different parts of the organization.
One important capability in supplier development is continuous improvement (or Kaizen). In a Schumpetarian or evolutionary context, firms, residing in a world which is too complicated to comprehend fully, have a disposition to satisfice. Such satisficing behaviour is dislodged by heightened performance aspiration and/or by re-igniting learning through continuous improvement (Winter 2000) . The practice of continuous improvement amounts to an effort to re-ignite the quest for improvement in organizational routines 'so frequently that the flame burns pervasively and continuously' (Winter 2000, p.993) , rather than starts and stops in relation to the identification and solving of a specific problem (Winter 1994, p.103 ).
Continuous improvement is inherently firm-specific in its application and results, and therefore is part of the intangible assets, for which no ready market exists. The distinctive and difficult-to-replicate character of such assets is central to the sustenance of a firm's competitive advantage. It also explains why firms differ, even in the same industry in the same country (Nelson 1991) .
The organizational capabilities framework makes it possible to classify the content of supplier development programmes along the following two dimensions:-(a) Type of capability, classified into three levels: first, the most basic level of 'maintenance capability' (i.e. the ability to maintain a particular level of performance consistently), second 'improvement capability' (Fujimoto 1997, p.12) i , which affects the pace of performance improvements, and third the highest level of 'evolutionary capability' (i.e. capability for capability building) (Fujimoto 2000, p.246 ). This last is to be distinguished from 'dynamic capabilities' (Teece and Pisano 1994) to the extent that the emphasis is less on 'adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external resources in response to changing environments' (Teece 2002 ) and more on the sustained accumulation of the other two capabilities. This, then, resembles dynamic capabilities in moderately dynamic markets, rather than in high-velocity markets, as elaborated by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) .
(b) Scope of activity: ranging from supplier development activity focused around a model-specific component, to that for the whole factory or the whole company. The broader scope implies not just an expansion from a specific production line to a larger production area, but also an expansion to non-production areas (such as product development and capital investment decisions).
The most limited aim of supplier development is to intervene in order to teach 'maintenance capability' with respect to a specific component. At the other extreme, the most ambitious aim is for a company to replicate at its supplier a whole set of organisational 'routines' underlying its own evolutionary capability.
In 'Japanese-style' supplier relationships, suppliers are given a consistent set of incentives to learn and acquire organizational capability from their customer companies. Such relationships are variously characterized as relational, obligational, trust-based and voicebased (Dore 1983 , Macneil 1985 , Helper 1990 , Sako 1992 , Smitka 1989 ). The precise mechanisms which structure such incentives include long-term trading that induces investment in relation-specific skills (Asanuma 1989 ), a joint problem-solving approach adopted in developing 'black box' parts (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Fujimoto 1997) , and a clear rule for sharing gains between the automaker and the supplier (Smitka 1989 , Macmillan 1990 ). Despite these incentive-structuring mechanisms, there remain at least three obstacles to replication of automakers' organizational capability by suppliers. Consequently, incentive structuring is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for facilitating suppliers to acquire organizational capability. Differences in core capabilities to overcome these barriers to replication explain why firms in the same industry differ despite similarities in incentive structuring mechanisms.
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First, barriers to replication of organisational capability is due to the tacit nature of the knowledge being taught to suppliers. Manuals (i.e. for standardization and codification) may exist, but typically, hands-on instruction must accompany classroom teaching, which makes the process of replication labour-intensive (e.g. sending engineers to spend a significant amount of time on the supplier's shopfloor) and expensive (because economies of scale are difficult to exploit). In this study, we may conjecture from the chosen mode of supplier development (e.g. shopfloor visits vs seminars) what the automaker's presumed degree of tacitness concerning that which it is purporting to teach. The more automakers rely on teaching through the practice of routines rather than the representation of routines, the more complete the replication process is likely to be. Moreover, doing and teaching are different things. In a craft skill context, some are excellent at doing but are unwilling to teach a trick or two because that would undermine one's power. More noted in the recent management literature on knowledge is the fact that some are excellent at doing but are unable to teach because of the tacit and complex skills involved: 'we know more than we can tell' (Polanyi 1967, p.4) . How can the amount of 'telling' be increased to match the level of 'knowing'? This study shows empirically that the firm's teaching capability is enhanced when there are opportunities for it to practice in different settings.
Second, replication may be problematic because of a high degree of interdependence among a firm's supplier development process and other processes (or 'routines') in the organisation. It has been noted that: 'Recognizing the congruences and complementarities among processes, and between processes and incentives, is critical to the understanding of organisational capabilities' (Teece and Pisano 1994, p.544) . Consequently, partial imitation of a few elements in a successful model may yield little benefits (Milgrom and Roberts 1995) .
For example, the 'lean production' model is essentially interpreted to apply to the shopfloor.
But 'lean production requires distinctive shopfloor practices and processes as well as distinctive higher order managerial processes' (Teece and Pisano 1994, p.543) . This implies that as a cumulative process, there is an in-built bias towards automakers' strategy to broaden and deepen the scope of supplier development, as they extend their activities beyond shopfloor improvement procedures.
Third, this pressure to extend the coverage of capabilities in supplier development programmes is at loggerheads with certain types of corporate governance. A system of corporate governance shapes who makes investment decisions in corporations, what types of investments they make, and how returns from investments are distributed (O'Sullivan 2000) .
If a supplier is regarded as a legally distinct unit of financial control, the voice of the buyer company may, or may not, be taken into account in the supplier's investment decisions and returns from investments. When performance improvement is a joint effort by the buyer and the supplier, a rule for sharing gains may emerge. Such a rule eliminates the need to negotiate each time gains are made, as well as align the incentive of suppliers to reveal the gains when they are made. More tricky is the claim by buyer companies to have a say in the supplier's investment decisions. The replication of routines and processes across legally distinct units of financial control may, therefore, be constrained by the need to compromise suppliers' financial (and more broadly managerial) autonomy in the process of replication.
Case Studies at Toyota, Nissan and Honda
Toyota
Origin of Supplier Development
Toyota Motor Corporation's purchasing philosophy is enshrined in the 1939
Purchasing Rules which state: 'once nominated as Toyota suppliers, they should be treated as part of Toyota (as branch plants); Toyota shall carry out business with these suppliers without switching to others, and shall make every effort to raise the performance of these suppliers ' (TMC 1988 p.76; Kyohokai 1994, p.18) . But the post-war trigger for thinking more concretely about supplier development was the so-called enterprise group diagnosis (keiretsu shindan) conducted by the Aichi Prefectural Government during 1952-53 (Kyohokai 1967 , pp.24-5, Wada 1991 see also Fujimoto 1997, p.76&p.212; Nishiguchi 1994, p.65) . The public sector consultancy chose the Toyota keiretsu (in practice Toyota and its 21 key suppliers) as the unit to evaluate along four criteria, namely the existence of a management policy, productivity improvement, quality improvement, and the fulfillment of production plans (Kyohokai 1967, p.24) . The consulting exercise resulted in a heightened expectation that Toyota provide assistance to improve suppliers' company-wide managerial capabilities.
In Control (TQC) to the suppliers. This is the origin of the bifurcated responsibilities for supplier development within Toyota (see Figure 1) . Subsequently, the synergy generated in the simultaneous application of TPS and TQC in the 1960s was enormous (Shimokawa et al (eds) 1997, pp.23) . It is well understood that TPS, a fragile low buffer system, exposes quality problems through line stoppages and forces management to fix the root cause of the problem.
Less noted in the literature is the contribution TQC has made to the rapid diffusion of TPS across Toyota factories, not only by educating middle managers in quality control techniques but also by using Hoshin Kanri to link the shopfloor processes and targets to the policies of higher level management. (Mr. Nemoto quipped that lean production is the Toyota way minus Total Quality Control (Shimokawa et al (eds) 1997, p.7) . ) By extension, Toyota's suppliers benefited from the simultaneous teaching of TQC and TPS.
OMCD's Diffusion of Toyota Production System
Toyota Production System focuses on the elimination of waste, and is credited with the creation of a set of tools and procedures, such as Kanban, quick die change, and autonomation (Ohno 1978 , Monden 1983 . What came to be known as the Toyota Production System was initially introduced to all Toyota factories in the 1960s. These factories demanded just-in-time delivery of parts, but a real effort to implement just-in-time production within supplier factories did not begin until the 1970s (Kyohokai 1994, p.91) .
Despite this time lag, the establishment of the Operations Management Consulting Division (OMCD) as part of Toyota's production control function in 1970 facilitated a seamless transfer of knowledge about Toyota Production System within Toyota and across to its suppliers. This internal structure enabled OMCD to bypass the purchasing function and establish direct links with core suppliers. Because OMCD is in charge of implementing TPS both within Toyota factories and at its core suppliers, the same methods, procedures, and heuristics are applied to internal and external factories by putting the same set of engineers in charge of both. The OMCD employs around 50 supplier development engineers, who have come up the ranks after in-company training placements in Toyota factories. Within Toyota, Factory Jishuken (kojo jishuken) --an autonomous study group --takes place as a culmination of education and training for Toyota's middle managers and first-line supervisors. They are considered the most important repository of Kaizen know-how on the shopfloor (Ishida et al 1996 , Nemoto 1997 . Regular Kaizen presentation meetings for factory managers and higherlevel management structure the supervisors' incentive to make continuous improvements with concrete results (Ishida et al. 1997 ).
Jishuken Groups for suppliers to improve their shopfloor by refining the application of TPS came about in the 1970s, but were kept under wraps from external eye for a decade or two. By all accounts, Jishuken seems to have had an informal beginning with some suppliers requesting help from OMCD which took their top managers on a tour of other suppliers'
shopfloor. But the system became fairly formal by the early 1980s. In the late 1990s, there were nine Jishuken Groups in all, two for body makers (9 factories) and seven for parts manufacturers (47 factories). The total is therefore 56 factories belonging to 52 enterprises, accounting for 80 per cent of all purchasing spend by Toyota. Toyota has given regard to geographical proximity and the absence of direct competitors in forming these groupings.
Such considerations are deemed important for intensive interaction and sharing of know-how during Jishuken sessions.
Every calendar year, Jishuken activities are carried out within the broad policy direction issued by OMCD (the 1998 focus, for instance was to adapt to model mix changes and output fluctuations in the age of low demand). Within such a framework, each Jishuken company chooses a specific theme in discussion with OMCD, and identifies a specific factory area for study by the Group. Every year, each supplier company hosts a study over a two months period. The study session begins by setting concrete performance targets in terms of shopfloor indicators, such as productivity, cost reduction, and inventory turns. The senior OMCD engineer in charge visits a supplier company under study around three times during the two months period and generally makes severely critical observations, whilst more junior OMCD engineers visit the company at other occasions to give more detailed guidance.
Jishuken members meet once a week to put forward concrete Kaizen ideas, most of which are implemented by the host company before the two months are up. (For example, at JECO, 222
of the 248 Kaizen ideas put forward in total were implemented, an implementation rate of 90%.) A typical gathering would consist of around 30+ people, as each supplier company nominates five participants. At the end of the year, all the Jishuken Groups gather in one location to make presentations of their year's achievements. Written documents of those achievements are compiled and handed out to all participants.
Besides Jishuken, Toyota's OMCD also provides individual assistance to suppliers on an if-and-when-necessary basis. For instance, the purchasing department may request assistance for a supplier with a pre-production problem in fixing its component quality.
What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of bilateral assistance and group activities like Jishuken? An OMCD manager gave the following eloquent answer.
Individual assistance is good whenever we are looking for quick results. When a supplier's profits have plummeted suddenly, or when a supplier is not keeping up with the launch of a new model, we send in our trained experts and tell everyone to watch quietly. But this short-term, yet deep, intervention requires a tremendous amount of resources on our part. More likely than not, suppliers feel they have
improved by doing what they are told, but do not understand why, and things come to a halt when the experts go home. By contrast, Jishuken is good for developing and training people, both at the suppliers and at Toyota. In order to make improvements towards a set of targets by everyone putting their ideas forward, there are various obstacles to be overcome along the way. It would most certainly be quicker for an expert to take a lead and provide answers, but this would not result in developing the skills of those who are led. The strength of the Toyota Production System lies in creating as many people who can implement and put into practice the TPS on their own as possible. So the most important thing for the survival of TPS is human resource development. But also there is no point in holding study group sessions without concrete results, because then companies would not be profitable. So we do put serious pressure for Jishuken Groups to meet the targets.
Thus, Jishuken is a closely knit gathering of middle-level production technologists from a stable group of companies, who engage in the experience of jointly developing better capabilities for applying TPS through mutual criticism and concrete application. The two modes of delivery by the OMCD, namely the Jishuken group activities and individual assistance, are synergistic, in that the former gives suppliers the space to experiment and explore on their own while the latter provides a top-down quick solution by Toyota experts, which on its own may discourage learning. Jishuken also has the benefit of developing Toyota's own personnel in teaching tacit skills. Both modes of supplier development give Toyota enormous access to the detailed cost structures of its main suppliers. This contributes to the sustenance of Toyota's core capability to engage in target costing, and to the retention of manufacturing know-how for components which Toyota does not produce in-house. Thus, there is a fine line to be drawn between monitoring and learning (Beaudet 1998, Hisatake and Negishi 1996) .
The Purchasing Department's Diffusion of TQC
Like the OMCD, the Purchasing Department also relied on bilateral and multilateral modes of supplier development. In the multilateral mode, the Department has been in charge of the supplier association, Kyohokai, which, despite its ever-expanding membership, remains a forum for imparting and sharing information in the supplier community. They hold regular seminars, study group meetings, training courses, exhibitions and presentations of members' achievements in various matters including cost, quality, delivery and development (Kyohokai 1994 , Sako 1996 .
More concrete individual guidance is given to suppliers that aspire to obtain the Toyota QC Award, established soon after Toyota won the Deming Award in 1965 to motivate suppliers to adopt TQC (Kyohokai 1994, pp.74-5; Nemoto 1978) . As of September 1996, a total of 44 suppliers obtained the Toyota QC Award. The Quality Technology Section of the Purchasing Planning Department offers hands-on guidance in Hoshin Kanri, quality assurance, cost control, Genba Kanri, delivery management and so on. Because of this traditional TQC focus, the Purchasing Planning Department defines supplier assistance to be about capability enhancement (taishitsu kyoka, 'the strengthening of one's constitution' in a literal translation). This is necessarily a long-term undertaking, involving assistance in marketing, cost and investment planning, cost control, process improvements, and quality improvement.
More recently, however, an urgent task surfaced with the recession in the 1990s.
Whereas in 1988, 57 out of the 77 major suppliers (with 20% or more sales dependence on Toyota) saw their revenues and profits increase, by 1993, only 3 were experiencing increases while 57 were facing declining revenues and profits. Toyota responded by creating in 1993 a Kaizen Promotion Section within the Purchasing Planning Department, staffed by 21 employees (15 of whom came from factory-level production engineering sections, while the rest had cost and accounting expertise). The main task of this new section is to help suppliers secure profits in the short run by various means including cutting pay and freezing investment. In effect, the Purchasing Planning Department's supplier assistance is two pronged, one aimed at the short-term recovery of loss-making suppliers and the other for longer-term capability enhancement regardless of profitability problems. When we go into a supplier, we do not put the purchasing function at the forefront.
We can see everything at the supplier company including the detailed breakdown of costs. If rationalization is for the sole purpose of passing on the gains to the purchasing department, suppliers would rather not make any improvements. So we do not let the purchasing department know how much productivity improvements a particular supplier has made as a result of our intervention.'
Similarly, a Purchasing Planning manager was confident that most suppliers are reassured of the absence of a direct link between supplier assistance and price negotiations:
No supplier would do Kaizen if such a link is made. Within Japan, we tell the suppliers, don't worry, there is no need for such fear. If improvements were made with OMCD assistance, the OMCD would never pass on to purchasing the information with a view to reflecting it in component prices.
A supplier, participating in Jishuken and receiving assistance from the Purchasing Planning Department, reinforced this view:
There are occasions, like with VA, when Toyota says let's split the gains where they relate directly to markets. But we feel that Toyota provide guidance, quite consciously bringing our attention to other aspects from which we can gain for ourselves regardless of Toyota. They tell us from time to time to direct our Kaizen effort to these aspects.
In effect, the supplier in question is allowed to keep the gains from an OMCD intervention.
To summarize, Toyota's OMCD has a separate existence from the Purchasing Department, facilitating a smooth transfer of know-how between internal factories and supplier factories, and giving suppliers an incentive to enhance their evolutionary capabilities for the long-term rather than to seek a quick fix for commercial advantage. The OMCD and the Purchasing Department, separately, emphasize the need for both short-term fixing of problems and long-term capability enhancement. The resulting array of supplier development channels, from group-based activities to individual assistance, enables Toyota to ensure that both explicit and tacit knowledge is communicated to its core suppliers (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000) . Moreover, suppliers, by being taught TPS and TQC at the same time, are able to exploit the synergy in sustaining continuous improvement.
Nissan ii
Discontinuous History of Diffusing Synchronized Production and TQC
Like Toyota, Nissan's Yokohama plant received an enterprise group diagnosis in 1953. The diagnosis revealed that many of the owner-managers of Nissan's subcontracting firms came from technical backgrounds, and lacked interest in management issues. The diagnosis report recommended that Nissan provide guidance for its suppliers in 'clearer management direction, better organization structure, managerial planning and scientific management principles, improved time management, and more attention to production management' (Ueda 1997, p.226) . In reality, however, Nissan's assistance was initially restricted to the shopfloor, and it was not until the 1980s that broader managerial issues (including TQC) were taken up seriously as a topic for supplier development. As described below, the history of Nissan's supplier development activity is marked by (a) significantly early starts in adopting or devising new techniques, but also by (b) discontinuities in initiatives for Nissan's internal factories and those for its suppliers.
Synchronized production (doki seisan) is Nissan's own philosophy and method for a demand-pull low-buffer production system, dating back to the early 1960s. As a management philosophy, it sought to exploit the existing imbalance between the firm and the environment as an opportunity for making continuous improvement. This philosophy was to be implemented in three stages: (a) through line balancing to improve the efficiency of machinery and manpower; (b) through balancing production processes with processes which precede and follow production; and (c ) through synchronizing the production system with a future management vision (Takarakai 1994, pp.116) . Juzo Wada, heading the purchasing department in the 1960s, is credited with devising the idea, and effected a 'synchronization experiment' in 1963 to spread this production system to core suppliers through the supplier association, Takarakai (Nissan 1965 p.388; Takarakai 1994, pp.116) . The experiment eventually faded way, and Nissan's purchasing function re-started supplier development with a focus on APM (Action Plate Method) in the 1970s and 1980s, and on Capability Enhancement Activity in the 1990s. The mid-1990s also saw Nissan establish a Synchronized Production Promotion Department in order to diffuse synchronized production internally to Nissan's factories. Thus, unlike at Toyota, the function responsible for diffusing synchronized production internally is separate from that for suppliers.
There is a similar de-linking between Nissan's internal efforts and actions for suppliers in the area of TQC. Nissan was awarded the Deming Prize as early as in 1960, and used Takarakai as an organ to provide education and training on TQC to member suppliers around that time (Udagawa et al 1995, p.86 
From Group-based to Individual Supplier-based Assistance
Nissan, like other automakers, has classified its component suppliers using multiple gradations. Initially, the core group was Nissan's main supplier association, Takarakai, consisting of around 100 member companies throughout its history . In 1966, a second supplier association, Shohokai, was formed as a looser gathering of bigger and more independent suppliers. In 1969, Takarakai implemented a major organisational reform, to introduce selectivity by making a distinction between activities for all members (e.g. lectures and QCC conferences) and 'autonomous activity' by six newly formed committees, each consisting of 10 or less member firms producing similar products (Takarakai 1994, p.58; Udagawa et al 1995, p.88) . These committees were very active in sharing information and ideas through mutual factory visits and study groups. Nissan's purchasing function was in charge of promoting supplier association activities by providing direction, advice and expertise.
In 1983, Takarakai's organization was restructured again by creating (a) a joint committee to seek common themes across the six committees, and (b) five specialist functional committees (in TQC, education, logistics, health & safety, and the promotion of Nissan cars) (Takarakai 1994, p.92) . Thereafter, the locus of activity shifted from the six committees to the specialist functional committees. This was followed by a further attempt to Department. In order to be member of this Committee, suppliers must be more than 20% owned by Nissan, over 30% of the supplier's sales turnover go to Nissan group companies, and the total annual sales to Nissan must exceed 20 billion yen. Although the 25 suppliers that met these criteria are expected to learn from each other, Nissan's assistance is largely on a one-to-one basis (see below).
Broadening and Deepening Supplier Development Activity
Nissan has two foci of supplier development activity, namely component-based assistance and factory-wide assistance. The former involves the teaching of various techniques to improve cost, quality, delivery and development, and is captured most recently by Saimal Activity. The latter, factory-wide assistance, is known as Capability Enhancement Activity, and incorporates synchronized production, TPM, and Genba Kanri. To summarize, Nissan's supplier development is much more individual company based than at Toyota, and suppliers share ideas and achievement through presentation meetings and displays but not through sharing in the experience of joint problem-solving.
But similar to Toyota, the scope of activity has broadened considerably over time, to factorywide assistance through its Capability Enhancement Activity, and to pre-production stages of component development through its Saimal Activity. The latter has been complementary to the former, in being able to incorporate tooling improvements or design change ideas that cannot be taken up for existing models in future models. Supplier development activities which are linked to supplier selection are thought to increase the effectiveness of the activities, and Nissan sees it as an advantage to be able to directly reflect the result of the supplier development activities in price revisions. In short, suppliers' mind is necessarily concentrated when it is a matter of survival in the form of securing future business.
Honda
Honda's Philosophy of Supplier Relations
Honda espouses free competition, equal partnership, and suppliers' managerial selfreliance as three fundamental principles in purchasing. These principles arose out of necessity and experience of being a motorcycle firm that entered the auto sector late in the 1960s. Free competition means that as a matter of policy, Honda is to buy products from anywhere in the world as long as they are good and cheap. Equal partnership means the avoidance of heavy-handed tutelage that has typified the relationship between Toyota and many of its long-standing loyal suppliers. Supplier's self-reliance implies balancing responsiveness to Honda's needs with a sufficiently diversified customer base.
Honda places its supplier development activity in the context of this purchasing philosophy. Its purchasing department sees its history of supplier development as reflecting a shifting balance between cooperation and competition, with equal weights in the 1970s, in favour of cooperation in the 1980s, and back towards competition in the 1990s. This seesaw originated after the 1973 oil shock when some of Honda's smaller suppliers found themselves at risk with a large reduction in Honda's orders. The recession since the 1990s poses a similar risk for some suppliers, but before Honda feels able to throw them out to face global competition, it is devoting resources to bring them up to world-class level of competitiveness.
Multiple Channels of Supplier Development
Honda's supplier development activity may be traced back to the formation of study groups in the aftermath of the first oil shock in 1973. By this time, Honda had nurtured a core group of suppliers with either shareholding or heavy trading linkages with Honda, in order to cope with a sixteen-fold increase in car production in its initial ten year history. Suddenly, with no growth prospects for the auto industry, Honda realized the need to cut costs to survive. Since Honda relied heavily on purchased parts and 50-60% of the parts costs were in materials, attention naturally turned to cutting the costs of materials. This material-focused activity eventually extended to examining production processes and capital equipment. At first, a team of seven Honda engineers from the Purchasing Department identified a group of 8 supplier companies, and started implementing changes, starting with cleaning the shopfloor (3S and 5S) and changing the factory layout. This activity came to be known as SBP ('Soft Best Position') as part of the Maru A Plan .
Typically, a model line was chosen at a supplier. At first, the Honda team made essential changes and showed what could be done, so as to convince the supplier that making those changes were worthwhile. According to a leading member of this initial team, talking about a typical supplier's shopfloor:
It was dirty, it was messy and there were so many problems. The starting point was what to do with all these problems. Honda realized that changes had to be made to compete globally, but also that its affiliates could not keep up with the competition.
We knew that treasures could be found among the mess, but once the main action points were listed, it became clear that suppliers would not be able to implement them if they were just told what to do. We came to realize that there was no choice but to work together. So we started by asking a supplier company to form a joint Kaizen team with Honda engineers.
Once such a joint team was formed, the Honda engineers were fully active in implementing shopfloor improvements, starting with 3S. Moreover:
We chose to work on the thing which would have the greatest impact on profits or quality. The issue was how to make suppliers' top management realize that the changes made would lead to greater profits or better quality, because once they realize this, things would run on an automatic pilot. We therefore had to work together to increase performance, and when that was achieved, Honda did not take away the fruit of the achievement. We entrusted this capital gain to the supplier management.
During the Maru A Plan period, a 50-50 sharing rule came into effect, and has been strictly adhered to ever since. 'There is no point in talking to the machining group about plastic moulding. The machining group must discuss what has to be done to become No.1 in the world of machining, while the plastic moulding group discusses what it takes to be No.1 in that sector', explained Honda's purchasing manager.
From Soft BP to Hard BP and SSP: Broader and Deeper Supplier Development Intervention
The core supplier development activity at Honda has been BP. BP, when the term was devised in the mid-1970s, stood for Best Position, although later in the 1980s it came to be various things, including Best Practice, Best Process, Best Performance, Best Profit and so on, particularly when applied to Honda of America Manufacturing. Within BP, there is also a distinction between SBP and HBP, which is very well known within Honda and the community of Honda suppliers. The two may be distinguished as follows.
1.
Soft BP is achieved through changes which can be made without spending money (e.g. 3S), while Hard BP is achieved by making new capital investment.
2.
Soft BP involves changes made after Job 1, while Hard BP starts from pre-production stage, around 2 years prior to Job 1.
3.
Soft BP results in kaizen (small improvements), while Hard BP results in kaikaku (larger jumps in performance improvement). For instance, a stamping press speed is made faster these days by relying on two speeds in a stroke, a fast speed until the press is close to the metal, and a slower speed when the press actually touches the metal sheet.
A large jump in performance was achieved when new investment was made to incorporate this two-speed stamping idea.
SBP originated in the post-1973 oil shock effort, while HBP became popular after the 1985 yen appreciation and the ensuing investment boom. HBP started towards the end of the Maru B Plan (1984-86) , when Honda demanded a 15% cost reduction from its suppliers (5-5-5
or Go-Go-Go, meaning 5% reduction per annum for three consecutive years). Since there were limits to how much changes one could make after Job 1, attention turned to Hard BP before the start of production. The HBP Campaign in Japan was formalized by setting up study groups of suppliers and Honda factories. Capital investment, particularly in laboursaving automation using specialised transfer lines, was regarded as a solution to productivity bottlenecks. While rapid capital investment was a general trend in the late 1980s bubble economy, Honda's own philosophy concerning its production system -particularly the idea of increasing line speed and shortening the lines by relying on specialised functional robots (Amikura 1989 (Amikura , 1992 ) -also fueled this tendency. With the benefit of hindsight, BP Campaign in Japan is therefore regarded as responsible for the expensive over-reliance on capital investment in Honda's supply chain.
During the 1990s recession, Honda shifted its emphasis away from Hard BP back to Soft BP, and sought less expensive improvements in work organisation, process layout, and problems with second-tier suppliers. In this vein, Honda announced a new initiative called SSP (Slim and Solid Production) as part of its Fifth Medium Term Plan. SSP marks a departure from previous supplier development programmes at Honda in extending the scope of development from a production line to the entire supplier company. A three step development is envisaged, first efficiency improvements in the production line, second in the product development system, and third in the management system so that it can expand sales and invest overseas. One Honda supplier development engineer is in charge of 3 SSP suppliers, and spends full-time guiding these three firms. Each SSP supplier appoints a LPL (Large Project Leader) and a PL (Project Leader), who are involved in setting performance targets which become part of the supplier's management plan. Linking the supplier's improvement activities to a company-wide management plan at the supplier may be seen to be the replication of Honda' own practice of linking supplier development programmes to its medium-term (three year) business plans. Since its inception, a new plan for supplier To summarize, one may conjecture that little supplier development would follow from Honda's purchasing philosophy of open competition and equal partnership, if taken at face value. In reality, however, Honda's supplier development activity started after the 1973 oil shock, and looks similar to Nissan's and Honda's in using both individual-based shopfloor assistance and study groups. Moreover, the content of Honda's supplier development activity has broadened and deepened over time, ultimately addressing the supplier's company-wide capability. This is evident in the progression from Soft BP to Hard BP, and the setting of SSP performance improvement targets as part of suppliers' management plan.
Comparisons and Discussion
Figure 2 summarizes the main supplier development activities at the three Japanese automakers, by juxtaposing them along two axes identified in Section 1, namely the type of capability taught to suppliers and the scope of activity. This section discusses three things with reference to Section 1's framework: (a) similarities among the three companies' organizational capability in supplier development, (b) how the three companies differ in this respect, an (c) the issue of replication of such supplier development systems outside of Japan.
Common Features of the Three Companies
(1) The recipients of supplier development assistance are divided into an inner group and an outer group. The recipients of intensive supplier development are limited to the inner core of strategic suppliers. This core is defined relatively narrowly, ranging from 25 companies at Nissan and 52 at Toyota, up to 63 at Honda. The long-term trading relationship, rather than share ownership per se, is the key to establishing shared goals between a automaker and suppliers. Nevertheless, even within this group with long-term commitment, each of the three automakers clearly distinguishes between the inner core of suppliers to which processes for 'capability enhancement' are taught in a hands-on manner, and the other suppliers who are only given incentives to make improvements through long-term customer commitment and a rule for sharing gains. This distinction ensures that tacit knowledge is shared only with the inner core. Over time, the stable supplier base, typically represented by supplier associations, has expanded, and the inner core group had to be identified. The inner group of suppliers may be regarded as within the boundary of the focal firm, in so far as common language and processes promote knowledge sharing within that boundary (Kogut and Zander 1992) . give individual assistance and facilitate study groups for their suppliers. Third, an incentive for suppliers to engage in long-term learning is secured by devising rules to share specific gains from short-term intervention, and to let suppliers appropriate wider gains from long-term capability enhancement. Even at Honda which did not attempt to spread TQC to its suppliers, the linking of performance improvement targets to business plans (esp. in HBP and SSP) has ensured a company-wide commitment at the recipient supplier companies. In practice, all three companies started with assistance in shopfloor improvements. But the case studies show that over time, their activities extended to areas outside the shopfloor, and in particular product development processes in the 1990s. This broadening of the scope of supplier development is due to the coherence and complementarity in the hierarchy of routines (for example between TPS and TQC, or between pre-production and post-production processes in simultaneous engineering).
How Firms Differ
The three broad similarities listed above skate over some significant differences among the three automakers. In particular:
(1) They make different assumptions about the optimal extent of information and know-how sharing among the core suppliers. First, although all three companies created a forum at which a small group of supplier companies engage in joint study, some groups truly share in the process of problem-solving (Toyota's Jishuken being the extreme example), while others share successful solutions mainly through presentation meetings (as at Honda and Nissan). The focus on the latter assumes that much can be communicated through the representation, rather than the practice, of routines. At Toyota, study groups contain no direct competitors, whereas Honda and Nissan group suppliers according to their component sector. Know-how sharing is more likely to take place among suppliers in the absence of direct rivalry in business. The centralized unified structure has the advantage of making suppliers listen, but is accompanied by the potential danger of undermining their willingness to learn.
Replication outside Japan?
The organisational capabilities perspective points to the root cause of the difficulty in replicating the Japanese automakers' supplier development capability outside of Japan. Apart from (a) differences in historical trajectories and (b) tacit and difficult-to-codify knowledge contained in what is taught to suppliers, the enlarged scope of supplier development activity renders the replication of the whole system more difficult and unlikely. This is a serious point, indicating a deeper current that goes against the more superficial trends in convergence towards 'partnership'-based supplier relations in North America and Europe Sako, Helper and Lamming 1995) .
The IMVP supplier survey iv , conducted by the author in collaboration with Helper, asked suppliers how their customer company would react if a competitor offered a lower price for a product of equal quality. An increasing proportion of suppliers said their customers would 'help them to match a competitor's effort ' (from 39% in 1990 to 81% in 1994 in the UK, 33% in 1990 to 53% in 1994 in the rest of Europe, and from 34% in 1989 to 53% in 1993 in North America). Japanese suppliers that expected their customers to offer help, by contrast, declined from 45% to 40% of the total. But 18.7% of Japanese suppliers continued to receive long-term supplier development assistance ('customer company provided personnel who worked two weeks or more on suppliers' shopfloor to improve its processes'), while the proportions were 9.6% in North America and 6% in Europe. This is one indication that when suppliers answer 'customers help match a competitor's effort', they mean different types of help. Some help is for the long-term development of a supplier's capabilities. Others are more of a quick fix. An example of the latter is General Motor's PICOS programme, a one week shopfloor Kaizen workshop which is rarely repeated for the same supplier. Thus, even with the diffusion of stable supplier relationships, supplier development in North America and Europe may continue to have a less ambitious aim to improve suppliers' maintenance capability and perhaps their improvement capability, but rarely their evolutionary capability.
This less ambitious aim in supplier development is intricately related to differences in corporate governance between Japan, North America and Europe. Honda's distinction between SBP and HBP provides a concise illustration of this point. In Japan, Honda initially targeted SBP, then moved onto HBP which required Honda to be intimately acquainted with its suppliers' investment and management plans. In the US, Honda of America Manufacturing (HAM) began to implement SBP in earnest in 1987, but faced suppliers' reluctance to disclose financial and other information to HAM particularly when it came to HBP (e.g. involving capital investment in new plants) (MacDuffie and Helper 1997) . The distinction between HBP and SBP is used for suppliers in the UK also. However, HBP is said to be difficult because it touches on the heart of management decisions over capital investment. Some supplier company managers told Honda UK that they needed shareholders' approval, and shareholders' interest may well conflict with making capital investment. A senior Japanese purchasing manager at Honda UK asserted: 'Various activities have started here, and UK managers have begun to understand the need for HBP in form, but not many have really felt the need under their skin as they continue to pay attention to shareholders.' Hence, HBP as a supplier development programme is also an issue of corporate governance. Differences in corporate governance are likely to lead to persistent differences in the content of supplier development activity.
In conclusion, the contrast made in the current study is not so much just between short-term adversarial vs long-term cooperative supplier relationships, or between buying-in from a lean supplier vs creating one. Even with an apparent shift towards longer-term committed relationships, there remains an essential difference between a relationship in which the automaker is just a good source of information on 'best practice' and a situation in which the automaker actually teaches the know-how to enhance the supplier's organizational capabilities.
Conclusion
Social scientific research on supplier relations has been intricately linked to attempts at developing a valid theory of the firm that addresses both its internal governance and the boundary decision. From the supplier relations perspective, the theorizing was very much taken in two steps; first, firms decide over whether or not to make or buy (the boundary decision), and second, they decide over what sort of relations they wish to have with suppliers (arm's-length or relational). Transaction cost economics (TCE) was used for the first decision (Williamson 1975) , whilst TCE was increasingly supplanted by other theories (e.g. on trust) to account for hybrid modes that lay between market and hierarchy (Adler 2001) . This marriage of TCE with other theories has been uncomfortable, not least because TCE is primarily a static theory that has little to say about innovation and the internal governance of firms.
As a better alternative, the organizational capabilities perspective adopted in this article focuses on how firms can best draw their boundaries so as to enhance their capacity to accumulate their competence or capabilities. Accordingly, the boundary of the 'firm' is defined, not by law (and the share ownership patterns) nor exchange (i.e. calculations of transaction costs), but by considerations over the production of capabilities. As shown empirically, within the capability-based organization boundary, 'routines' exist for tacit knowledge to develop and replicate easily. This boundary, however, may go well beyond legally defined corporate entities, if a buyer firm providing supplier development is allowed to take part in suppliers' investment decisions. Thus, the replication of organizational capabilities is not just a matter of collective-cooperative learning, by shielding actors from 'high powered' market pressures. It is also a matter of corporate governance. In making a conceptual distinction between maintenance and improvement capabilities, we assume that the daily management of production requires a conscientious application of the standard work methods. However, as Nemoto points out, there are two meanings of standardization, one referring to absolute standards for safety or compatibility, such as British Standard or JIS, and the other to the process of improving any points which are found to be deficient by following the standard work methods (Nemoto 1985, p.63) . In the latter meaning, standardization is not an end but the beginning of making improvements (see also Adler 1993 . In this sense, maintenance capability is intricately linked to improvement capability.
One common 'routine' for 'improvement capability' (but not for maintenance capability) is policy deployment (Hoshin Kanri) in Total Quality Control, which involves the setting of objectives for improvement to be achieved within a specified period of time. The term, Hoshin Kanri, was coined in 1965 by the tire maker, Bridgestone, when it was preparing for the Deming Award in 1968. The company felt the need to coin a new term that focused on processes, because the known technique of MBO (management by objective) tended to become too results oriented (Kogure 1988, p.162) .
ii This sub-section describes the situation at Nissan prior to Renault's equity participation.
iii Nissan has put much emphasis on educating both its own employees and suppliers about Genba Kanri. The internal education is the responsibility of the Personnel Department, while the responsibility for spreading it to suppliers resides with two experts in the Engineering Support Department. The Genba Kanri course for suppliers consists of the teaching of NTWI (Nissan's version of Training-within-Industry), and a five-day practice course involving a competition among 3 teams of 7 participants each over solutions to building a plastic car model. Each team contains participants from several different supplier companies, and is potentially a forum for suppliers to learn from each other.
iv Questionnaire surveys were sent to first-tier suppliers in North America, Japan and Europe in 1993 and 1994. Response rates were 55%, 30%, and 16%, with valid samples of 675, 472, and 262 in North America, Japan and Europe respectively. See Sako, Lamming and Helper (1995) for details.
